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Abstract
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court
restricted standing to sue for recovery of damages su⁄ered from a breach of
federal antitrust law to direct purchasers only. Even though typically antitrust
injury is, at least in part, passed on to ￿rms lower in the production chain and
ultimately to consumers, Illinois Brick is binding precedent in a majority of
states. In this paper, we draw attention to a strategic abuse of the rule as a
shield against antitrust damages claims. We show that Illinois Brick facilitates
upstream ￿rms to engage horizontally in a collusive arrangement by focussing
concealed vertical side-payments to discourage civil action on their direct pur-
chasers only. Downstream ￿rms are passed part of the upstream cartel pro￿ts
through a symmetric rationing of their inputs at low prices. This ￿ Illinois Wall￿
arrangement sustains collusion in the production chain, substantially reducing
total welfare. The more competitive the up- and downstream industries other-
wise are, the more scope there is for the arrangement. Illinois Walls are shown
to be resilient to entry, as well as to variations in the legal system. Several
recent U.S. cartel cases display Illinois Wall symptoms.
JEL-codes: D4, L1, L4.
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vertical restraints, rationing.
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11 Introduction
Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, individuals or ￿rms injured in their business or
property by companies in breach of federal competition laws can claim treble damages
in civil actions in order to be made whole. Since the production of goods or services
typically involves a number of intermediate ￿rms, any upstream anticompetitive be-
havior, such as price-￿xing, is likely to spill-over into several markets, causing larger
and smaller monetary injury in the production chain, before ultimately falling in
part on the consumers. As a result, the precise break-down of such vertically spread
antitrust damages is potentially complicated, involving applied general equilibrium
analysis and sophisticated econometrics.
Twin Supreme Court rulings, the ￿rst in 1968 in Hanover Shoe Co. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., the second in 1977 in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, have
signi￿cantly reduced the complexity of private punitive damages claims, however.1 In
Hanover Shoe, the defendant, United Shoe Machinery Co.￿ which was earlier found
to have monopolized the machinery market through long-term leasing contracts￿
claimed that the plainti⁄, Hanover Shoe Co., a direct purchaser, was not injured
by these anticompetitive contracts, because it had been able to pass the claimed
overcharge on to its customers. The Supreme Court ruled against this defensive use
of pass-on, ￿nding that it would unduly lengthen and complicate antitrust cases and
dissipate private incentives to seek antitrust injury recovery. As a result, irrespective
of the question to what extent the direct purchaser indeed su⁄ered damages, by
Hanover Shoe it is entitled to recover three times the defendant￿ s overcharge.
Several years later, the State of Illinois claimed in conjunction with several hun-
dred local governmental institutions to have been harmed by a ￿xing of concrete block
prices by the defendant, Illinois Brick Co., which arti￿cially increased the costs of the
contractors through which the plainti⁄s carried out their construction contracts in a
complex vertical chain. In its Illinois Brick decision, the Supreme Court also disal-
lowed this o⁄ensive use of the pass-on argument, thus setting a companion standard
to Hanover Shoe. The plainti⁄ was denied compensation and the precedent was set
that only direct purchasers can successfully seek the recovery of damages from ￿rms
that breached federal antitrust laws.
In Illinois Brick, the main legal argument for denying indirect purchasers standing
to sue is due to a multiple liability problem created by Hanover Shoe. Since the direct
purchaser is entitled to the full overcharge by the latter standard, allowing indirect
purchasers to sue for further money, as well, would e⁄ectively multiply the total
liability of the defendant well over the three times total damages enunciated in the
Clayton Act as the appropriate remedy. Illinois Brick thus repairs a liability problem
Hanover Shoe created￿ albeit at the expense of possibly permitting una⁄ected parties
to bring a damages claim, while denying parties that did su⁄er damages reparation.
Numerous scholars have, moreover, defended the pair of rules on economic grounds.
1 Cf. 392 U.S. 481 (1968) and 431 U.S. 720 (1977), respectively.
2In their March 1979 testimony to the Senate￿ s Subcommittee on Antitrust and Mono-
poly, William Landes and Richard Posner took the view that the intent of Congress to
allow for private damages claims in passing the Clayton Act was ￿rst and foremost to
provide for an extra trust-deterrence by creating a private channel of policing, along-
side public enforcement.2 They therefore emphasized e¢ ciency rather than fairness
of compensation as the appropriate criterion to judge Illinois Brick. Since direct pur-
chasers typically have superior information on the e⁄ects of any anticompetitive acts
of their suppliers, isolating monetary incentives with a small group of e¢ cient detec-
tors, rather than allowing for many fragmented indirect purchaser suits, is likely to
enhance detection at signi￿cantly reduced legal transaction costs. Also, any costs in-
volved in coordinating class action suits of parties damaged indirectly￿ and therefore
each possibly only a little￿ are reduced with the incentive to ￿le a private dam-
ages claim placed in a single hand. Moreover, the determination of all pass-ons of
arti￿cial cost increases would require courts to perform multiple, complicated and
time-consuming analyses involving a large number of interested parties, which would
be a social loss.
However, Illinois Brick has also been heavily disputed. To begin with, three
Supreme Court judges dissented in the original decision. Also, in both the Senate
and the House of Representatives bills were proposed, but never enacted, to overrule
the two Supreme Court rulings. In their long argument, Robert Harris and Lawrence
Sullivan maintained that pass-on calculations are not su¢ ciently complex and costly
to justify denying indirect parties their right to be made whole.3 A number of fur-
ther developments in jurisprudence have somewhat softened the strict restriction on
indirect purchasers￿standing to sue. Since the 1981 Supreme Court decision in J.
Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., parties that only dealt with the
cartel members indirectly can nevertheless ask in a civil action for injunctions to
break up the upstream cartel in state courts.4 Also, in its 1989 decision in California
v. ARC America Corp., the Supreme Court left it to the discretion of individual
states whether or not to allow indirect purchaser suits.5 As a result, limitations on
who has standing to sue in private antitrust damages cases today vary from state
to state￿ with states allowing indirect purchasers to claim antitrust damages being
referred to as ￿ Illinois Brick repealers￿ .6 Whilst a substantial number of states have
since repealed fully or in part, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick nevertheless continue
to stand as binding legal constraints in many important antitrust damages cases.7
2 Landes and Posner (1979). See also Lopatka and Page (2004) and the references therein.
3 Harris and Sullivan (1979). For a critical reply to Harris and Sullivan (1979), see Landes and
Posner (1980).
4 Cf. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
5 Cf. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
6 Cf. Davis (1997), Page (1999) and Hovenkamp (1999).
7 In December 1998, for example, in Alex Campos, et al., Petitioners v. Ticketmaster Corpo-
ration, No. 98-127, the Supreme Court reestablished that the petitioners were rightfully barred by
the Court of Appeals from recovery of damages by the defendants appeal to Illinois Brick. Also,
3Opposition remains strong, but is essentially based on fairness objections and the
assessment that legal transaction costs are not prohibitively large.8
In this paper, we draw attention to a detrimental e¢ ciency e⁄ect of this state
of a⁄airs which, we believe, should be weighed against the set of rules￿potential to
increase private incentives to bring anticompetitive practices to light and reduce the
costs of legal procedures. By e⁄ectively shielding antitrust violators from all private
parties but those directly involved, we argue, Illinois Brick may potentially give
upstream ￿rms a safe-haven to engage in collusive arrangements, as long as they can
discourage their direct purchasers￿ and them only￿ from ￿ling suit. Thus allowing
potential violators to focus discouragement e⁄orts on the sole party with standing
to sue may neutralize part of the purported enhanced private incentive e⁄ect Illinois
Brick.
Suggestions to this e⁄ect have been made in passing in the early literature. Har-
ris and Sullivan (1979) remark that a restriction of standing to sue to the direct
purchasers may e⁄ectively foreclose private suits to the extent that the ongoing rela-
tionship between the potential defendant and the direct purchasers has value to the
latter.9 The authors were satis￿ed, however, that judicial experience showed that
cases nevertheless were brought by direct purchasers. In Snyder (1986), the pos-
sibility of direct purchasers fearing ￿retaliation￿by their suppliers, on which they
may depend, is noted yet similarly dismissed.10 The idea found little acclaim in the
extensive literature on Illinois Brick and private antitrust damages cases. To our
knowledge, it never inspired a thorough analysis.
An early concern has been whether the increased incentive e⁄ect for direct pur-
chasers would be su¢ ciently strong to outweigh the reduction in cases that before
were brought by indirect purchasers. The question inspired several empirical analy-
ses that quite consistently found an increase in the total number of private antitrust
damages cases after Hanover Shoe in 1968, yet a more than o⁄-setting decrease after
Illinois Brick in 1977. Landes and Posner (1979) already report a structural reduc-
tion from 1977 to 1978￿ that is, immediately after Illinois Brick￿ in the total number
of private cases brought in various districts. The authors hesitated, however, to con-
clude from this that Illinois Brick led to more than a correction of the Hanover Shoe
increase. Instead, they conjectured that the fall in private damages actions re￿ ected
an overall downward trend in public enforcement from 1977 to 1978, noting that pri-
Microsoft escaped private damages in several states (while settling for billions of dollars in others) by
appealing successfully to Illinois Brick￿ cf. Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., No. 60, 2/28/02 and ￿In-
direct Purchasers Barred From Bringing Claim Against Microsoft Under State Statute,￿Electronic
Commerce & Law Report, Volume 7, Number 11 of Wednesday, March 13, 2002.
8 Cf. Hovenkamp (1999), Section 16.6, or the stand on Illinois Brick of the American Antitrust
Institute at www.antitrustinstitute.org.
9 Cf. op. cit., pp. 351-2. Similar concerns were forwarded by some of the proponents of bills
to overrule Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. Cf. Sneeden (1979), p.219.
10 Op. cit., p.470n.
4vate claims often follow up on adverse ￿ndings in public actions.11 But again later
studies, involving more post-ruling data, in Snyder (1986) and Joyce and McGuckin
(1986), found more than a reversal after Illinois Brick of the increase in the number
of private cases since Hanover Shoe, suggesting a permanent negative e⁄ect of the
pair. Still, however, the authors would not conclude that the e⁄ects could be due to
the Supreme Court constraints to private litigation￿ as the over-all decrease in the
number of private cases found was small and statistically insigni￿cant. Instead, the
net e⁄ect of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick was interpreted to be ￿neutral￿ .12
One reason perhaps for why the few initial observations that Illinois Brick could
discourage private antitrust damages actions were so easily discarded may have been
that the long-term relationships at stake in the chain were perceived merely as issues of
￿continuity and goodwill,￿as Harris and Sullivan (1979) referred to them. They were,
that is, not understood to actively involve the suppliers. It is, indeed, questionable
that direct purchasers would value such weak ties su¢ ciently to keep them from
exercising their right to obtain treble the overcharge￿ which is typically a lot of
money. Still this is likely to be true when switching from one supplier to another
involves non-negligible costs, such as in the relationship with a software company
responsible for a company￿ s main management information systems, or that with
the external accounting o¢ ce. Even though ￿ling a claim against such vital suppliers
would certainly put stress on the service relationship, probably leading to embroilment
and a discontinuing of trade, the costs involved in overcoming these exogenous market
imperfections probably do not amount to the many millions of compensation typically
at stake in antitrust damages cases. Moreover, true retaliation would often itself be
a violation of law, o⁄ering independent possibilities to seek justice.
A much more serious cost to consider by downstream ￿rms before ￿ling a com-
plaint, however, would be any speci￿c bene￿ts actively forwarded by the suppliers
to the direct purchasers as part of their collusive arrangement. Schemes, in other
words, through which downstream retailers bene￿t in intricate ways from the pres-
ence of the upstream cartel, and that would stop if the cartel were to be sued in court.
Claims that vertically passed-on cartel bene￿ts are indeed a reality have been made
in the more recent literature.13 In the context of Illinois Brick, such downstream
bene￿ts could be interpreted as a stick-and-carrot to keep the direct purchasers from
exercising their unique right to recover private damages. When such side-payments
from the anticompetitive upstream industry to their downstream purchasers, made
in exchange for not ￿ling suit, are at stake, then one can speak of ￿ retaliation￿against
￿ling a private antitrust damages claim. The side-payments would in that case be
withdrawn, as the civil actions would lead to the breakdown of the upstream collusive
arrangement￿ that is the source of the money. This kind of long-term relationship is
11 Op.cit., pp.632-4.
12 Snyder (1986), p.482; Joyce and McGuckin (1986), p.239.
13 See Levenstein and Suslow (2004) and some of the references there cited. The issue is further
discussed in Section 6 below.
5all the more interesting, not only because it is likely to provide a substantially larger
incentive for the direct purchasers, but also because it is costly for the suppliers
to maintain. An interesting question to ask, therefore, is whether such upstream-
downstream collusive agreements are tacitly sustainable, and what role Illinois Brick
can have in setting them up.
In the following, we consider circumstances in which ￿rms may use Illinois Brick
to raise an ￿ Illinois Wall￿between themselves and their indirect customers further
down in the chain, so as to shield themselves from private damages claims￿ and
hence detection￿ through private enforcement. In a model of a vertical production
chain, there is a variable number of ￿rms in competition in an upstream industry
(also referred to as ￿ wholesalers￿ ) that sell their products as inputs to a competitive
group of direct purchaser downstream industry (￿ retailers￿ ), which in turn sell their
output directly to the ￿nal consumers. Up- and downstream ￿rms have repeated
interaction over an in￿nite period of time, which captures the long-term nature of
their trade relationship. The upstream industry may seek to collude and ￿x prices.
If it does so, it can, by appealing to Illinois Brick, concentrate its e⁄orts to keep
those a⁄ected by its anticompetitively high prices from ￿ling a treble damages claim
solely on the retailers. With them it needs to work out an attractive compensation
scheme, which is covert and leaves no obvious evidence of retail involvement. If
it would, antitrust suits could potentially be brought by the consumers, then the
direct purchasers of an upstream-downstream-cartel. The two industries manage to
do this using a simple rationing scheme. By symmetrically selling to each of the
downstream ￿rms only a limited amount of inputs at a low input price, the upstream
cartel creates an arti￿cial scarcity on the market for ￿nal consumer products that
is bene￿cial to the downstream ￿rms. This tacit vertical understanding between
the industries creates consumer detriment, yet escapes prosecution. And because of
that, so does the upstream cartel, even if the whole upstream-downstream collusive
arrangement would be common knowledge.
The potential perverse e⁄ect of Illinois Brick we point out is just one aspect of a
more extensive treatment of incentives e⁄ects from private damages claims and their
contribution to e¢ ciency that includes Salop and White (1986), Salant (1987), Baker
(1988), Besanko and Spulber (1990), Briggs, Huryn and McBride (1996) and Har-
rington (2004a). The seminal Salop and White (1986) surveys aspects and empirics
of private antitrust enforcement￿ in which Illinois Brick is only brie￿ y mentioned
as a desirable ￿trimming of the plainti⁄s￿powers and strengthening the defendants￿
powers￿(op. cit., p.1039). Baker (1988) and Besanko and Spulber (1990) in essence
extend the position of Landes and Posner (1979) that private antitrust enforcement
provides a more direct, and therefore better informed channel, thus enhancing legal
e¢ ciency. These papers focus on asymmetric information, arguing that in the pres-
ence thereof, private claims increase e¢ ciency and should therefore be encouraged, in
particular through su¢ ciently high damages multiples. Salant (1987) shows instead
that increasing the damages multiple may raise the market price when ￿rms incorpo-
6rate the threat of private penalties in their objective functions. Also in Briggs, Huryn
and McBride (1996), in which the interplay between public cases and private follow-
up suits is considered, a potential ine¢ ciency of the trebling of damages is pointed
out. As defendants invite parties to bring follow-on treble damages cases by signalling
a weak position when they settle in the public case, ine¢ ciently many public cases
are brought in equilibrium, that moreover are battled over long in court, whereas set-
tlements would otherwise have been e¢ cient. In Harrington (2004a) it is shown how
participants of past cartels that have since fallen apart may still non-cooperatively
sell at prices higher than competitive levels, knowing that a low post-cartel price level
will serve as a base for large private antitrust damages estimates. The possibility that
Illinois Brick may deter private damages claims and facilitate collusion, however, is
not considered in this literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, industry
relations and the competitive benchmark are modelled in a repeated game setting.
Section 3 considers upstream collusion and the damage it does. It is established
that when standing to sue for private damages is unrestricted, collusion is always
deterred. Section 4 presents our ￿ Illinois Wall￿ . It is shown that, when downstream
￿rms are su¢ ciently patient, the arrangement shields the upstream industry from
antitrust damages claims, thus generically facilitating collusion. In Section 5, the
Illinois Wall is shown to be detrimental and robust. In particular, it is shown how
the more competitive both the up- and the downstream sector initially are, the more
scope there is for the strategic abuse of Illinois Brick. Section 6 discusses various
symptoms of the e⁄ect in recent U.S. cartel cases, including Lysine and De Beers,
which may indicate that Illinois Walls are indeed a reality. Section 7 concludes.
Proofs of the results are o⁄ered in an appendix.
2 Upstream-Downstream Competition
Consider a market in which n upstream ￿rms, indexed i = 1;2;:::;n, each produce a
di⁄erentiated good against constant marginal costs c that, without loss of generality,
are normalized to be equal to zero, and no ￿xed costs. Each upstream ￿rm has a
unique relationship with one of the (consequently n) downstream retailers, in which
it sells an amount qi of its wholesale product at a price pi. Each retailer prepares
its wholesale inputs for retail in a linear production process that, for simplicity, is
assumed to involve no further costs, in order to produce its ￿nal consumer commodity,
of which it subsequently sells an amount Qi at price Pi. There are no capacity
constraints. Consumer demand for variety i is given by the demand function
Qi (P1;:::;Pn) =
(1 ￿ e)(1 ￿ Pi) ￿ e
P
j6=i (Pi ￿ Pj)
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)
; (1)
where e 2 [0;1) is a measure of the (symmetric) product di⁄erentiation between the
varieties, ranging from distinct monopolized markets (e = 0) to competition between
7next to fully homogeneous commodities (e close to 1).14 The organization of the









































Figure 1: Di⁄erentiated goods marketed in competing parallel vertical production chains.
Retailers and wholesalers compete on prices in a Bertrand fashion. Furthermore, it
is assumed that the market exists inde￿nitely, without technological progress changing
its supply structure, nor demographic or other changes shifting demand. As a result,
the up- and downstream ￿rms are engaged in a long-term relationship. In their
strategic planning, ￿rms all take an in￿nite time horizon as a basis, in which they
discount future pro￿ts at a common quarterly rate ￿ 2 [0;1). Market interaction
can therefore be understood as Bertrand competition in a repeated game framework.
When both industries act non-cooperatively, the one-shot Bertrand equilibrium is
played in each period. Since the wholesalers control the inputs of the retailers, this
is a sequential game, of which the subgame perfect equilibrium is found by backward
induction, as follows.
14 This speci￿c way of capturing product di⁄erentiation in a linear demand function was orig-
inally proposed in Bowley (1924). It is used extensively in the modern literature￿ e.g. in Vives
(1999) and Harrington (2004b)￿ and based on utility maximization by a representative consumer
with a taste for variety, as speci￿ed in Appendix A.1.
15 The analysis in this paper is restricted to a market structure with competing vertical chains
that have exclusive single-product dealing arrangements. It may alternatively be that each upstream
￿rm deals with more than one downstream ￿rm. Likewise, competition may be stronger at the
upstream level, for example with wholesalers that all sell the same homogenous input, which the
downstream ￿rms use to produce di⁄erentiated consumer goods. The market structure we analyse
in the paper is analytically most transparent. Moreover, as discussed in Section 5, when an Illinois
Wall exists in the present model, it always exists in these more competitive market structures.






















e;n are positive parameters, the value of which depend
on n and e.16 From this the implied demand for upstream ￿rm i follows as




in which Ae;n, Be;n and Ce;n are related positive constants.
Each upstream ￿rm i subsequently chooses pi, given p1;:::;pi￿1;pi+1;:::;pn by
maximizing pro￿ts based on the implied demand equation (3). The resulting set
of best-reply functions determines the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium wholesale prices.
Since product di⁄erentiation in the demand structure is symmetric, it su¢ ces to
consider symmetric Nash equilibria only, so that all wholesale and all retail prices
are the same. Let this common upstream equilibrium wholesale price be pc, and the
downstream equilibrium retail prices be P c￿ where the superscript ￿ c￿refers to this
being the competitive benchmark case.
With all prices known, similarly equal equilibrium upstream sales qc and down-
stream sales Qc follow. The resulting pro￿ts are, in accordance with prices and quan-
tities, indicated by lower case ￿c for an upstream ￿rm and upper-case ￿c for each
￿rm downstream. Notice that due to the one-to-one production technology used in
the conversion of wholesale bulk into retail sales, the up- and downstream quantities
traded in equilibrium are equal. That is, qc = Qc.
3 Upstream Collusion and Damages Claims
Suppose now that the upstream industry conspires to ￿x the wholesale prices charged
to the downstream retailers. Suppose the cartel is able to ensure internal stability.17
Let the downstream industry remain competitive. The upstream cartel will then be
able to act as a monopolist on the demand function (3) and, in order to maximize
cartel pro￿ts, it sets the prices of all products equal to one half, i.e., pa = 1
2￿ where
16 A complete characterization of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is given in Appendix A.2.
17 In the following, the focus is on the stability of vertical collusive arrangements between the
up- and downstream industries. Horizontal cartel stability can be guaranteed under reference to the
traditional cartel stability arguments￿ primarily punishment strategies as introduced in Friedman
(1971). In addition, note that the possibility to erect an Illinois Wall allows for the upstream
cartel to coordinate using quite explicit arrangements￿ which arguably makes it more easy to reach
agreement than purely tacit means would. The issue is taken up again in Section 5.
9the superscript ￿ a￿refers to the fact that the upstream ￿rms now engage in ￿ anticom-
petitive behavior￿ . Let the resulting equilibrium sales be denoted by Qa = qa, with
pro￿ts for an individual upstream ￿rm denoted by ￿a, and individual downstream
￿rm￿ s pro￿ts under the upstream collusive scheme denoted by ￿a.18
Colluding in this manner is obviously pro￿table for the wholesalers. The retailers,
however, are hurt by the upstream cartel. Since their products are imperfect substi-
tutes, the retailers price above marginal costs in equilibrium, so that they do not pass
the entire increase in input prices on to the consumers. Hence, they will see their
pro￿ts decrease as a result of the increased wholesale prices. Also, since demand is
elastic, by the same argument the increased retail prices cause consumer detriment.
Should, therefore, the wholesalers pursue their intentions to collude, in principle each
individual downstream ￿rm and each consumer would have an incentive to seek repa-
ration of the damages sustained from this anticompetitive act. To ￿le a successful
private antitrust damages claim requires that plainti⁄s can prove that the upstream
￿rms breached the federal antitrust laws. Suppose in the following that su¢ cient
evidence to bring an admissible antitrust injury claim against the upstream cartel is
available to all parties hurt by its conspiracy to restrict trade.
Exactly what should serve as a basis for determining the damages that a successful
claimant is entitled to is a matter of dispute￿ in court, as well as in the literature. It
is customary in U.S. antitrust law to calculate the damages su⁄ered from anticompet-
itive behavior as the so-called ￿ overcharge￿ . It is computed as the di⁄erence between
the anticompetitively raised price and the price that would have prevailed without
the anticompetitive acts￿ sometimes referred to as the ￿ but for￿price￿ multiplied by
the quantity purchased by the claimant under the anticompetitive regime. By thus
neglecting the elasticity of demand, the overcharge underestimates the lost pro￿ts
downstream, for it ignores pro￿ts that would have been made on the greater volume.
A similar dead-weight loss reduction of consumer surplus is also not accounted for in
this method.19
If the breach in￿ icted injury for longer periods of time, the overcharge is based
on total sales over the period in which the anticompetitive prices were being charged.
Plainti⁄s are, however, not allowed to include lost compounded interest over damages
sustained in the past.20 Moreover, the Clayton Act includes a statute of limitations
which requires civil actions to be ￿led within a four year period. Cases ￿led after
18 See Appendix A.3 for explicit solutions.
19 Lovell (1982) concludes that treble damages are actually double damages on the argument that
the dead-weight loss is half the monopoly pro￿t when demand is linear and average cost constant.
A more precise determination of damages, or to whom they should accrue, is typically not the
objective of the Court. Argumentation based on demand substitution is usually not entered, or only
mentioned in passing by the plainti⁄s to show their damage estimates are conservative. We thank
Frank Fisher for these insights. See also Page (1996).
20 That is, no pre-judgement interest is awarded on the claim. If, however, the alleged anticom-
petitive acts continued after the case was ￿led, and they are indeed found to be anticompetitive,
interest does accumulate from the ￿ling date onwards. Cf. Lande (1993).
10this period are in principle not admissible so that no damages can be awarded, even
when the anticompetitively raised prices remained by subsequent ￿routine￿following
of the dated cartel agreement. The statute of limitations need not apply when the
antitrust violation was ￿fraudulently concealed.￿In practise, however, the cases are
often di¢ cult to prove.21 Also, the statute can be tolled in government proceedings,
and in several high-pro￿le per se o⁄ences, including price-￿xing, it was indeed put
aside and damages were awarded for longer periods.22 On the other hand, given such
issues as the absence of pre-judgement interest, the probability of preclusion by reason
of lapse of time, the possibility of an out-of-court settlement, and increasing di¢ culty
to document back claims due to the deterioration of evidence, so that it becomes
increasingly burdensome to prove in court that damages incurred in the distant past
ought to be awarded, it is reasonable to assume that an accumulating damages claim
depreciates.23 In fact, balancing all these arguments, Lande (1993) argues that in
practice damages awards are on the order of single damages, rather than treble. We
need in the following only that any successful recovery claim is bounded.
Let the one-period total overcharge su⁄ered by a downstream ￿rm as a function
of an anticompetitively increased input price p and the quantity q purchased at that
price be de￿ned as
D(p;q) = (p ￿ p
c)q: (4)
Also, let the per period nominal damages multiple be ￿. Assume that, for the rea-
sons discussed above, indeed the accumulating damages stock depreciates by a factor
￿ 2 [0;1). As a result, from the starting date of the cartel agreement onwards, as
long as the cartel prices remain, damages accumulate digressively. Let Dt be thus
accumulated damages at period t, so that
Dt+1 = ￿Dt + ￿D(p;q):
Suppose that the date from which damages can be calculated is ￿￿ where ￿ could
be equal to the starting date of the cartel, T0, or it could be equal to T + 1 ￿ T s,
where T s ￿ 1 is the number of periods for which damages can e⁄ectively be claimed
before the statute of limitations applies. Note that if the statute of limitations does
not apply in a given case, T s ! 1. The state variable Dt then develops over time
21 Generally, for example, silence by the defendant is not enough, as it requires explicit acts such
as stating false prices on bills, or writing false statements, to show fraud. Cf. Lande (1993).
22 In the VISA Check/MasterMoney antitrust litigation, No. CV-96-5238, for example, brought
March 17, 1999 (and eventually settled in 2003 for $3.05 billion) although it was recognized that the
damages were, in fact, sustained since the anticompetitive introduction of Visa and MasterCard￿ s
debit cards in 1975 and 1981 respectively, the plainti⁄class was limited to recovering those damages
su⁄ered from the period October 26 1992 to the date of judgement. See http://www.inrevisacheck-
mastermoneyantitrustlitigation.com.
23 Cf. Harrington (2004b), on which our modelling of depreciating accumulating damages in the
following is based.






Each downstream ￿rm would potentially be entitled to this amount of money.
Likewise, the class of consumers￿ provided it has standing to sue￿ can claim







per product variety, where P is the ￿nal goods price asked in equilibrium by the
competitive layer of downstream retailers, which all face the anticompetitively raised
wholesale price. Q is their corresponding output.
In line with discounted back-damages, we abstract in the following from any fur-
ther legal transaction costs. If a private antitrust damages suit with merit is brought
for the real damages multiple, it is assumed there will be no further di¢ culty in
substantiating the claim, so that it will lead with certainty to a granting of the deter-
mined damages money. Also, any legal costs involved in bringing an individual claim
are assumed to be negligible. It may be, for example, that the downstream ￿rms
share their legal costs, as only one initial court case, brought by a single downstream
￿rm or as a class action, would in principle su¢ ce for all downstream ￿rms to claim
their individual damages at little incremental costs in follow-on suits. Henceforth, we
will assume therefore that when one individual downstream ￿rm ￿les suit, all others
will follow and the upstream industry will be ordained to pay damages based on the
industry wide overcharge. Consumer also handle their claims collectively in a class.
Finally, in order to isolate the documented e⁄ect that private damages claims are
essential in bringing anticompetitive behavior to light, we abstract until Section 5
from the possibility that any other cases, such as shareholder suits or public criminal
actions, are brought against the upstream cartel. In these circumstances, we have
the following benchmark result.





such that, as long as ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and both downstream ￿rms and consumers have
standing to sue for reparation of their antitrust damages, any upstream cartel will be
deterred.
The result is not trivial. The reason for this is a potential perverse e⁄ect created
by the overcharge calculus practice. Since parties can ￿le claims for determined
amounts of money, irrespective of the extent of their actual injury, they may in
fact, when the available multiple damages surpass the true hurt, be encouraged to
postpone notifying the arrangement and accumulate a future damages claim instead.
12In particular, this may be tempting for the downstream ￿rms, which are able to pass
part of the overcharge on to the consumers, so that they may be damaged really
only very little. But even for the consumers, who certainly share in the burden, the
possibility of later being awarded several times the overcharge, which may be more
than the true injury, may sustain collusive agreements that have over-all detrimental
welfare e⁄ects for longer periods of time, even when all involved are aware of the cartel
and the damage it does. In Brina (1983)￿ which discusses the misuse of the statute
by ￿rms in breach of federal competition laws seeking to escape damages claims￿ it
is explained how the original rationale for the statute was to prevent such a ￿ wait and
see￿attitude towards slumbering anticompetitive arrangements. Our result shows
that when back-damages are bounded by the four years statutory limit or depreciate,
a limit is put to such postponements for less than single nominal damages.
4 An Illinois Wall
When all parties have standing to sue, the private antitrust enforcement channel
alone would generally install su¢ cient incentive to discipline the upstream indus-
try into behaving competitively, even when less than single nominal damages are
awarded. Hence, collusion is likely to be deterred by the threat of antitrust damages
claims, unless the upstream cartel can somehow ward them o⁄. Here is where the
potential anticompetitive abuse of Illinois Brick comes into play. One way to avoid
damages claims, namely, would be to pay those with standing to sue a su¢ ciently
high compensation for the loss they incur when they refrain from exercising their
right to claim damages. By giving only the direct purchasers standing to sue for an-
titrust damages, Illinois Brick allows the upstream cartel to focus any such bribing
e⁄orts solely on the downstream industry. Even if consumers would know about the
existence of the upstream cartel, that is, they would be barred from bringing a claim
against it, for they only deal indirectly with those in breach of competition law. If
side-payment were not so focussed by law, they would not generally be possible, since
the cartel can typically only pro￿t from its collusive arrangement at the expense of
total welfare.24 Illinois Brick may thus create a safe-haven for upstream collusion by
allowing to build an ￿ Illinois Wall￿between the cartel and indirect purchasers further
down in the chain.
It is not obvious, however, that a side-payment scheme to buy the silence of each
downstream ￿rm exists. The key is that the upstream cartel compensates the down-
stream ￿rms for their true injury plus the amount of treble overcharge they are entitled
to irrespectively by Hanover Shoe. Also, while one can think of several ways in which
24 Under certain conditions, when competition is little to begin with, combined horizontal and
vertical collusive arrangements can, in fact, enhance total welfare, as they (partly) eliminate double
marginalization in the chain. The issue is discussed below the theorem in the text. Regions for which
it applies in our model, and a subtle relationship to our Illinois Wall arrangement, are identi￿ed in
Section 5.
13the upstream ￿rms can indeed pass on some of their cartel pro￿ts to compensate their
direct purchasers￿ ranging from overt money transfers to o⁄ering CEO￿ s all-inclusive
jaunts to the Tropics￿ any scheme to complement Illinois Brick has to satisfy several
constraints. It should be su¢ ciently interesting for the downstream ￿rms to accept
the arrangement. This implies, among other things, that no retailer has an incentive
to bene￿t from the side-payments ￿rst, and then ￿le suit after all. Also, the involve-
ment of the downstream ￿rms should not leave evidence to the consumers￿ or other
indirect purchasers. If it would, these next-in-line indirect purchaser would be the
direct purchasers of an identi￿able cluster of up- and downstream ￿rms in breach of
antitrust law and thus have standing to sue for treble damages against the full chain.
Furthermore, the arrangement has to be simple enough for all parties involved to
understand its value with little or no communication.
One possible compensation scheme that satis￿es these constraints amounts to a
restriction on the number of wholesale inputs the upstream cartel sells to their down-
stream retailers. This creates an arti￿cial scarcity on the downstream market, from
which the downstream ￿rms bene￿t. Particularly this is so if the cartel distributes
limited amounts of goods evenly over the various downstream retailers, and charges
relatively low prices per unit. When the downstream ￿rms are ￿ put on allocation at














































Figure 2: An individual downstream retailer ￿ put on allocation at low input prices￿ .
The ￿gure displays the individual situation of a downstream ￿rm that is horizon-
tally in Bertrand competition with the varieties o⁄ered by the other retailers. The
upstream cartel supplies the downstream ￿rm with a restricted quantity of inputs
14qi only, at an input price per unit of pi. Given its linear production technology￿
involving no further costs by assumption￿ and in the knowledge that all other down-
stream ￿rms have been allotted a similarly restricted number of inputs and therefore
each have limited supply as well, each downstream ￿rm can safely expect to sell its
qi = Qi units at a consumer market price of P i. That is, in equilibrium, each down-




, in which P is short




, so that the individual
downstream pro￿ts under this rationing scheme are represented by area P iacpi:
Given equilibrium residual demand, the input price that would have corresponded
to this sales price of P i, if it were not for the upstream cartel arti￿cially rationing
the input levels, is p0
i, with an associated pro￿t of P iabp0
i. Hence, the quantity-
constraint-low-input-price combination increases the pro￿ts of the downstream ￿rm
by an amount represented by p0
ibcpi. This extra pro￿t can be understood as com-
pensation for the downstream producer awarded by the upstream ￿rms. If the direct
purchasers do understand the rationing at low prices in this way, the arrangement
can act to silence the sole party with an incentive and the power to speak up and
unmask the anticompetitive arrangement. No money passes hands. The deal is tacit,
simple, and thus covert. It requires little or no communication and therefore need
not leave any evidence so that it can escape prosecution under the antitrust laws
by consumers￿ other indirect purchasers or government authorities, for that matter,
should they be more alert. After all, the upstream ￿rms can hardly be forced by law
to supply more inputs than the downstream ￿rms claim they are willing to buy.
The arrangement allows for a stable Illinois Wall, as follows. Suppose that the up-
stream cartel puts the downstream retailers symmetrically on allocation by choosing
a single reduced price-quantity combination (p;q) for each variety. In light of this,
each downstream ￿rm determines its pricing decision as follows.
max
Pi
(Pi ￿ p)Qi (P1;:::;Pn) (5)
s.t. Qi (P1;:::;Pn) ￿ Q = q;
where the latter equality follows from the one-to-one production technology. In the
symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, this results in equal output prices P that clear
the market for each variety. Note that setting input levels as well as input prices
e⁄ectively gives the wholesalers￿cartel control over its retailers￿consumer market
behavior. This partly integrates the objective functions in the vertical chains, reduc-
ing the problem of double marginalization that otherwise exists for the wholesalers.
The integration is not perfect, however, as the cartel￿ s choices are constrained by the
fact that the side-payments required for silence are passed on using these very same
instruments. The explicit solution to (5) is given in Lemma 7 in Appendix A.4.25
25 It is not obvious that each retailer indeed sets its downstream sales Qi equal to the maximum
capacity Q o⁄ered by the upstream cartel. The reason for this is that, given (p;q), each downstream
15Knowing this best-reply equilibrium play of the downstream retailers, the up-
stream cartel can design a rationing scheme that maximizes pro￿ts, whilst obeying
the restriction that none of the retailers has an incentive to bring a private damages
claim. This is equivalent to a trigger strategy, in which the upstream cartel rations
at a low price as long as no ￿rm in the downstream industry sues. If any of the
downstream ￿rms decides to bring a private damages claim, the upstream cartel un-
ravels and the industry reverts to Bertrand competition. Enforced by competition
authorities and courts, this cartel breakdown is a credible threat to a retailer that
considers to sue.
Faced with this situation, the (symmetric) pro￿ts of each individual downstream
￿rm when refraining from suing and accepting the side-payments instead are￿ at





If a downstream ￿rm would opt to bring a private treble damages suit, we assume
that it receives the lucrative bribe for the period in which it defects from the tacit
arrangement, plus multiple damages￿ which, in line with the model e¢ ciency of the
legal system, we assume for simplicity to be awarded without delay. As said, because
of Hanover Shoe, each downstream ￿rm can seek a well-de￿ned amount of damages
money, even if it was in fact able to pass the larger part (or all) of the anticompetitively
raised input price on to the consumers.
In order to establish that the Illinois Wall is an equilibrium under the largest
possible threat of damages claims to the tacit arrangement￿ which forms the tightest
incentive constraint for erecting a wall￿ we assume in the following that at the time
of determining the value of the total damages claim, the cartel has existed already
since the beginning of time. An upper-bound, for any period T, to the total value of











in which T s is set equal to in￿nity if, for whatever reason, the statute of limitations
would not apply. The parameter ’ is referred to in the following as the ￿ real￿damages
multiple and it corresponds to the maximum value of accumulated damages. The
value of the real damages multiple increases in the nominal damages multiple ￿, the
statute of limitations T s and in the damages depreciation factor ￿. When damages
can only be claimed for one period, obviously, ’(￿;￿;1) = ￿. Should the damages
￿rm may have a unilateral incentive to purchase fewer inputs than the q o⁄ered by the cartel, thus
supplying less output against a higher consumer price on its residual demand curve. In Lemma 7 in
Appendix A.4, we derive a condition on (p;q) under which Qi = Q in equilibrium. In the proof of
Theorem 1 in Appendix A.4, it is shown that the Illinois Wall always satis￿es this condition.
16claim have been led to accumulate until in￿nity before the wholesalers￿cartel was








so that ’ has an upper-bound, because ￿ is strictly smaller than 1.26
Once the illegal arrangement has been brought to the attention of the authorities,
it is discontinued and we assume that the industry will revert to normal competitive
Bertrand pro￿ts for the rest of time. Hence, maximum total discounted pay-o⁄ from
￿ling a private damages suit for each individual downstream ￿rm at time T is






In order to be able to raise a stable Illinois Wall, the cartel should choose the
pair (p;q) so that for each downstream retailer the present discounted value of the
stream of future payo⁄s under the rationing upstream cartel regime is at least as
large as the value of the damages claim plus the discounted value of pro￿ts under up-
and downstream price competition. That is, the downstream ￿rms will refrain from
exercising their unique right to claim reparation of antitrust injury if
1
1 ￿ ￿






where replacing DT by ’(￿;￿;T s)D(p;q) assures that this is indeed the tightest
incentive constraint the upstream cartel will ever face. Observe that satisfying the
constraint is facilitated by the fact that because the downstream ￿rms are put on
allocation at low input prices, the level of actual damages is relatively low, compared
to when full upstream cartel prices would have been charged. The ￿ putting on al-
location at low input prices￿therefore reduces the retailers￿incentive to notify the
arrangement in two ways: it increases the per period gains from accepting the bribe
for silence, and it lowers the damages total that can be claimed by defecting and ￿ling
suit.
Clearly, the possibilities for shielding the cartel depend crucially on whether or
not the downstream ￿rms weigh the future bene￿ts from going along with the side-
payment arrangement su¢ ciently high￿ as expressed by their common discount factor
￿. When, moreover, the upstream industry is able to maintain pro￿ts or raise them
above the Bertrand level, that is, if p ￿ pc, the Illinois Wall is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium. Note that this also assures that the remaining potential damages claim
for the downstream ￿rms is non-negative. Furthermore, observe that even though
26 Note that the alternative limit assumption, where damages do not depreciate but there is a
binding statutory limit, will give a ￿nite upper bound of lim￿!1 ’(￿;￿;Ts) = Ts￿. Typically, one
value of ’ can represent many di⁄erent actual antitrust damages practices. See also Section 5.
17each retailer is made just indi⁄erent between going along with the collusive arrange-
ment and ￿ling for multiple damages, which makes the anticompetitive arrangement
particularly attractive for the upstream cartel, the downstream ￿rms are in no po-
sition to demand more of the surplus, for they cannot credibly threaten to sue for
damages with the bribe in place. In all, this allows for our main result.





’(￿;￿;T s)pc + (1 ￿ 2P c)
; (9)
Illinois Brick sustains the upstream cartel. That is, there exists a pair (pw;qw), such
that ￿w > ￿c and none of the downstream ￿rms has an incentive to exercise its unique
right to sue for treble antitrust damages.
The proof of the Theorem is given in Appendix A.4. Some intuition for when
an Illinois Wall can be raised, as well as for the relationship between ￿
￿ and the
up- and downstream prices in the competitive benchmark, follows from viewing the
construction of the wall from the perspective of the upstream cartel. As noted, by
choosing q, the upstream cartel is able to determine consumer prices P = P (q),
and hence total revenues per variety, P (q)q, in the chain￿ which equal total chain
pro￿ts, since production costs are normalized to zero. Upstream control is restricted
by the need to compensate the downstream retailers for not exercising their right
to damages. The second instrument used for this side-payment transfer is the input
price p. The optimal Illinois Wall arrangement now balances the marginal increase in
total chain revenues of an increase in q with the marginal compensation costs required
for it. Consider this problem per variety i. Let the per-period compensation costs be
denoted by Ci (q). It is easily seen that compensation must at least be equal to the
normal competitive pro￿ts plus the potential damages claim, so that



















where in the last expression the value of p that just satis￿es incentive constraint (8)


















Note that there are two opposing e⁄ects on compensation costs from a decrease in q.






P ￿ p + p ￿ pc￿
q = ￿+D and Ci = ￿ into condition (10) returns
(8) holding with equality. Note how this alternative expression brings out very clearly that, as
discussed in the text, a decrease in p a⁄ects the incentive constraint in two ways: it increases the
downstream compensation in ￿, and it decreases the damages money D that can be sued for.
18thereby the upstream price p that is required to keep the downstream ￿rms in the
arrangement. This e⁄ect is always negative and increases damages. The second e⁄ect
is a quantity-e⁄ect and works in the other direction: if the quantity q decreases, the
overcharge is calculated over a smaller of units and damages go down. The net result
of the price and quantity e⁄ects is ambiguous.
The marginal increase in total chain revenues for each variety are




Denote by qm the quantity that maximizes total chain revenues, i.e., MRi (qm) = 0.











qm qw qc pc
Figure 3: Cartel calculus under the Illinois Wall.
Obviously, as the marginal revenue at the quantity qm is higher than the marginal
compensation, it pays for the cartel to increase output beyond the level that would
maximize pro￿ts for the whole chain.
Variations in the value of ￿ and ’￿ which in turn varies with ￿, ￿ and T s￿
shift the MCi (q) curve. Lower values of ￿ correspond to less patient retailers that
demand more compensation to accept the collusive arrangement, which is re￿ ected by
a rotation of MCi (q) through the point where MCi (q) = 0, that is, where MRi (q) =
pc, so that marginal compensation increases everywhere in absolute value. Higher
values of ’ similarly increase marginal compensation by making claiming damages
19more attractive. As a result, qw can lie anywhere between the competitive and the
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which re￿ ects that marginal revenue at the optimum is always negative, due to the
extra incentive-e⁄ect that a decrease in q decreases damage.
The critical discount factor that just allows decreasing the input below qc to make
the cartel interesting for the upstream ￿rms is found where qw = qc, as drawn in
the ￿gure. In fact, as long as MRi (qc) < ￿1￿￿
￿ ’pc it pays for the upstream cartel
to reduce the quantity q below the competitive quantity qc, since this will increase
revenues more than it will increase the necessary compensation. For the speci￿c
model of consumer demand for varieties (1) we use, MRi (qc) = 2P c ￿ 1. Therefore
the critical value ￿
￿ in Theorem 1 is implicitly given by,
2P





It follows that for all ￿ > ￿
￿ we have MRi (qc) < ￿1￿￿
￿ ’pc.
Finally, note that for MRi (qc) > 0 there is no value of ￿ for which an Illinois
Wall exists. In this case, competition is little to begin with, so that the quantity
produced in the competitive benchmark is lower than that which would maximize
pro￿ts if the chains were all fully vertically integrated￿ that is, when qc lies to the
left of qm in Figure 3. Under these conditions, the problem of double marginalization
is such that a fully coordinated cartel can increase total welfare over the competitive
outcome.28 The upstream cartel, just using the simple mechanism of putting the
downstream ￿rms on allocation at low prices, cannot achieve this potential welfare
gain, however. Even though total industry pro￿ts increase when the cartel increases
output beyond the competitive level, any feasible Illinois Wall that prevents the
retailers from claiming antitrust damages would leave the wholesalers with lower
pro￿ts than they receive in competition.29 The upstream industry simply lacks the
instruments, that is, to redistribute the gain in total industry pro￿t that can be
achieved by increasing production. Note, however, that an openly fully vertically
integrated cartel involving all up- and downstream ￿rms would in these circumstances
ask lower consumer prices than prevail under competition. Hence, no party has any
damages to sue for under full chain collusion. Consequently, there is no need to use
the cumbersome and secretive Illinois Walls mechanism to shield an upstream cartel
when markets in the competitive benchmark are highly concentrated.
28 Cf. Spengler (1950), Greenhut and Ohta (1979).
29 It follows from Lemma￿ s 5 and 6 in the appendix that the optimal cartel price, pa = 1
2, will
always be larger than pc for n ￿ 2and e > 0. Moreover, upstream cartel pro￿ts are decreasing for
q > qc.
205 Resilience of the Wall
Having established that Illinois Walls can indeed exist, in this section we study their
scope in order to see whether they may be a concern. To begin with, observe that
the arrangement is so far set in quite adverse conditions. There are, for example, no
legal or informational imperfections behind which to hide collusive agreements and
escape detection and damages claims. Also, as a result of how we model vertical
relationships, there are potentially substantial economic pro￿ts in the competitive
benchmark, which makes the cooperative agreement harder to sustain. Yet, even in
those hostile circumstances, Illinois Walls turn out to exist generically, have serious
detrimental welfare e⁄ect and be robust.
Consider the space of actual discount factors for which the arrangement is an
equilibrium. A period in our model corresponds to one quarter of a year. For ease
of comparison, in all numerical analyses below, discount factors have been converted
into annual values. It follows immediately from the expression of the critical discount
factor in Theorem 1 that ￿
￿ decreases when pc or P c decrease. Hence, the more
competitive the up- and downstream industries otherwise are, the more scope there
is for erecting an Illinois Wall. Another way in which this e⁄ect manifests itself is
that ￿
￿ decreases in both n and e. Given n, for values of e close to one￿ that is, little
product di⁄erentiation￿ the value of ￿
￿ will be close to zero. Likewise, for all e > 0,
the limit of ￿
￿ goes to zero as the number of ￿rms grows without bound. Figure
4 pictures how the space of admissible actual discount factors for which the Illinois
Wall exists increases in n and e when ’(￿;￿;T s) = 48.30 A horizontal benchmark
line is drawn in at ￿ = 0:95 for comparison.
Clearly, when the industry is more competitive as measured along these two di-
mensions, the critical discount factor is generally well below typical levels in the 0:9
to 1 region. The reason why it is less di¢ cult to stabilize an Illinois Wall, the more
competitive the industry essentially is two-fold. Fierce downstream competition, with
output prices close to marginal input costs, implies that the downstream ￿rms pass
a larger part (or even all) of their overcharge on to the consumers. Consequently, the
monetary incentive to sue for private damages is smaller, as a successful claim will
recover the damages money, but has little long term bene￿ts since the true injury
from upstream collusion felt downstream is only small. At the same time, more com-
petition in the upstream industry makes the vertical collusion scheme more attractive
to each of the upstream wholesalers, compared to competing on prices, so that they
each can forward a larger sum in side-payments to the downstream retailers and still
pro￿t from the cartel. Hence, the more competitive the chain, the more there is to
30 Since all numerical analyses present annual data, ’(￿;￿;Ts) = 48 corresponds to treble
damages (￿ = 3), a statute of limitations of four years (Ts = 16) and no depreciation of damages
(￿ = 1). Alternatively, it can represent a situation in which the statute of limitations does not apply
(Ts ! 1) and damages depreciating at a rate ￿ = 15
16 ￿ 0:94 per period. Obviously many other,
less extreme, parameter combinations return this speci￿c value of ’.
21Figure 4: Critical yearly discount factors, as a function of n, for di⁄erent values of
e￿ from top to bottom: e = 0:5 (￿), e = 0:6 (+), 0, e = 0:7 (￿), e = 0:8 (￿) and
e = 0:9 (￿￿).
gain and redistribute between the wholesalers and the retailers and, therefore, the
more scope there is for Illinois Walls.
This interpretation is further substantiated by our analyses of alternative and
more competitive market structures in Schinkel and Tuinstra (2005). When, instead
of exclusive vertical dealing, each wholesaler supplies at least two retailers, so that
downstream shops have a number of di⁄erent commodities on display and conse-
quently competition drives consumer prices down to input prices, critical discount
factors are always lower. Hence, if Illinois Walls exist in the set-up in the text, then
they always also exist without exclusive dealing. An even stronger result holds when
the upstream industry is more competitive. If all upstream ￿rms produce one and
the same homogenous input, which is only converted into di⁄erentiated commodities
at the retail level, Illinois Walls exist for any positive values of the discount factor.
The reason for this is essentially that it is not necessary for the upstream industry to
trade-o⁄ a stricter rationing of the retailers with higher input price, as there are no
upstream pro￿ts in the competitive benchmark. Therefore, su¢ cient side-payments
can always be passed-on. Clearly, the potential to abuse Illinois Brick is not limited
22to the type of market structure analyzed in the text.31
Figure 5 delineates all forms of competition for which the arrangement is stable.
It plots annual iso-￿
￿ curves that separate all combinations of e and n for which an
Illinois Wall exists if the yearly discount rate is at least the value of that speci￿c
curve￿ again for ’ = 48. Take the curve ￿
￿ = 0:95, for example. For all markets to
the left of that curve, an Illinois Wall exists if the annual discount rate is at least
0:95: Hence, critical discount factors further out to the upper-right allow larger sets
of markets, whereas iso-￿
￿ curves closer to the origin leave smaller sets.32 For market
con￿gurations to the left of the dashed line in Figure 5, marginal revenue is positive
at the competitive quantity qc. As discussed at the end of the previous section, under
these conditions it is neither possible, nor practical to use the Illinois Walls mechanism
to hide an upstream cartel. Henceforth, we restrict attention to the larger class of
markets in which upstream collusion is detrimental to welfare and Illinois Walls are
an interesting proposition.
Illinois Walls are a real possibility in a large number of circumstances. But are
they generally a concern for welfare? Apart from reducing double mark-ups, the need
to hide behind a wall seems to imply that the cartel is disciplined by the amount of
patience the retailers have. In particular, ￿
￿ has been determined such that pw = pc.
As a result, one might expect discount factors su¢ ciently close to ￿
￿ to force the cartel
to set prices close to competitive levels, so that welfare losses are negligible.33 To see
whether this is so, in the upper two panels in Figure 6, welfare losses are set against
the number of competing products. The upper left (upper right) panel displays, for
’ = 48 and ￿ = 0:95, the ratio of consumer surplus (total surplus) under the Illinois
Wall arrangement to consumer surplus (total surplus) under competition.34 When n
is low, so that the competitive benchmark is poor, the ratio is equal to unity. Yet,
31 See Schinkel et al. (2004) for Illinois Walls in a model with homogeneous goods and a variable
number of ￿rms that are both up- and downstream horizontally in Cournot competition.
32 Obviously, if ’ increases at constant values of ￿ it likewise becomes more di¢ cult to sustain
an Illinois Wall. Note that the level curves in Figure 5 can, therefore, alternatively be interpreted
as representing critical values of ’. Keeping the yearly discount rate ￿xed at a reasonable value of
￿ = 0:95, the curves thus interpreted correspond, from left to right, to the values ’ = 48 (￿), ’ ￿ 99
(+) and ’ ￿ 154 (￿), respectively.
33 We are indebted to one of the referees for raising this issue.
34 Consumer surplus can be determined as V (P;:::;P;M) = M + n
2(1+(n￿1)e) (1 ￿ P)
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23Figure 5: Demarcating iso-￿
￿ level curves when ’(￿;￿;T s) = 48. From top to
bottom: ￿ = 0:85 (￿), ￿ = 0:9 (+), and ￿ = 0:95 (￿).
Illinois Walls become a welfare problem already when there are only few ￿rms, and
when they do, their detrimental e⁄ect is immediate and substantial. This does not
change when the increase in industry pro￿ts is taken as part of welfare, as in the
right upper panel of Figure 6. Both welfare ratios drop straight from the top line,
particularly for low levels of product di⁄erentiation. Low discount factors do not
discipline the cartel, that is, when there is some competition otherwise. Illinois Walls
are a concern whenever they exist.
To study the signi￿cance of the real damages multiple, the lower two panels of
Figure 6 develop consumer price P resulting under the Illinois Wall arrangement for
di⁄erent values of ’. The unrestricted pro￿t maximizing consumer price P a, as well
as the competitive price P c are drawn in for comparison. The solid lines represent
consumer prices when ￿ = 0:95 and ￿ = 0:9, respectively￿ the latter returns the
steeper line. In the left panel, commodities are more di⁄erentiated (e = 0:5) than in
the right panel, where they are close substitutes (e = 0:9). In both, the number of
￿rms is relatively small (n = 5). Clearly, P decreases linearly in ’ between P c and
P a. Although competition is restored between the more di⁄erentiated commodities
for values of the real damages multiple around that implied by the statutory limit,
even very high values of ’ do not su¢ ce to deter collusion when commodities are
24Figure 6: Upper left and right panels: Consumer surplus and total surplus under the
Illinois Wall as a fraction of consumer surplus and total surplus under competition,
for ￿ = 0:95, ’ = 48 and di⁄erent values of n. From top to bottom: e = 0:5 (￿),
e = 0:6 (+), e = 0:7 (￿), e = 0:8 (￿) and e = 0:9(￿￿). Lower left and right panels:
Consumer prices for varying levels of ’. Left panel: n = 5 and e = 0:5. Right panel:
n = 5 and e = 0:9. From top to bottom: P a, P for ￿ = 0:95 (￿), P for ￿ = 0:9 (+)
and P c.
close substitutes.
Finally, note in the lower two panels that when ’ approaches zero, so that private
antitrust damages claims are impotent, P goes to 1
2￿ and not, for example, to P a.
This illustrates how the control that the Illinois Wall arrangement gives the upstream
￿rms over their retailers is constrained by the double use of instruments. If the cartel
can determine downstream behavior without the need to ward o⁄ damages claims
(that is, if ’ = 0), it is able to fully eliminate the double mark-up problem and set
consumer prices as if each chain were fully vertically integrated.
In order to study resilience of the wall, ￿rst consider the threat of disclosure and
entry. We claim that the protection o⁄ered by Illinois Brick is such, that the upstream
cartel can be quite open about its horizontal activities. In the absence of public cases,
25everyone can have access to enough evidence of its existence to substantiate a private
damages claim￿ in fact, under the Illinois Wall, the downstream ￿rms need to have
su¢ cient evidence to credibly threaten the cartel with a claim. On the other hand, the
vertical side-payment arrangement needs to be kept a strict secret for consumers￿ and
other indirect purchasers. So consumers may know that they pay anticompetitively
raised prices, but they do not understand￿ or at least they cannot prove￿ how the
chain pro￿ts therein are distributed between the wholesalers and the retailers. Note
that this leaves many possibilities for vertical communication in the chain, as long as
evidence of it, su¢ cient to argue convincingly that the vertical arrangement existed,
does not fall into the hands of the consumers. The information issues play between
distinct groups, that is.
While the relative safe-haven provided by the Illinois Wall allows the wholesalers
to meet in smoke-￿lled rooms and discuss their conspiracy, which may help them to
keep it stable, there is no need for them to shout the existence of their cartel from
the rooftops.35 No one outside of the industry needs to know about it. Should pro￿ts
in the upstream industry nevertheless attract potential entrants, this is no di⁄erent
than the classical cartel entry problem. Downstream, on the other hand, entrants
that present themselves pose a potential threat that is particular to the Illinois Wall
arrangement. If, for example, the downstream ￿rms ask from the cartel not to allow
the new entrant in by refusing to supply it with inputs, the potential entrant could
attempt to bring an antitrust case on the grounds of refusal to deal, which￿ although
typically di¢ cult for new entrants to substantiate￿ as a provable infringement of
competition law may threaten the stability of the wall. For this reason￿ and with
the extra bene￿t that it lowers the critical discount factor￿ the incumbent retailers
may want to assimilate new entrants into the tacit agreement, rather than compete
with them or trigger legal battles. Although none of the participants in an existing
Illinois Wall arrangement would welcome entry, it is resilient to this pressure.
It should in this context also be noted that even though Illinois Walls exist for
lower discount factors, the more ￿rms are involved, an increase in the number of either
up- or downstream ￿rms, or both, also introduces issues of coordination and stability.
As in ordinary cartels, the larger the number of ￿rms in the upstream industry, the
more strain will be put on the horizontal collusive arrangement. Whether it can
remain is essentially a matter of su¢ cient patience again. Hence, there are two
con￿ icting e⁄ects of more upstream ￿rms here: on the one hand, it widens the space
of discount factors for which Illinois Walls exist, while on the other hand it narrows
the possibilities for sustaining the horizontal part of it. Likewise, note that large
numbers of downstream ￿rms may make it di¢ cult for all of them to understand
how it is exactly that they bene￿t from the Illinois Wall arrangement. We have
shown how, independently of the number of ￿rms involved, all downstream ￿rms
are willing to accept the level of input at which they are being put on allocation at
low prices. Furthermore, the side-payments have been set at a bare minimum, just to
35 See McCutcheon (1997) and the references therein given.
26make the downstream ￿rms indi⁄erent between joining the arrangement or ￿ling suit.
Typically, however, there are ￿nancial windfall gains upstream for the cartel that it
could apply, if necessary, to being more muni￿cent in trying to keep on the right
side of the downstream ￿rms. Yet, the probability that consumers get wind of the
arrangement, or that one of the retailers strays and brings the arrangement to light by
erroneously ￿ling an antitrust damages claim arguably increases in the complexity of
the industry. Although these observations merit more precise modelling, such would
merely qualify the shape and form of the Illinois Walls, and certainly not topple them.
The assumptions made so far about the availability of public information and the
related e¢ ciency of the legal system can also be relaxed. We have shown that Illinois
Walls are stable, even when the existence of the upstream cartel is common knowledge
and the legal system is perfect in the handling of private damages cases. If information
would be less than perfect, asymmetric￿ as in the argument that the direct purchasers
are more e¢ cient detectors than consumers￿ or if the judicial system involves non-
negligible costs, or if the eventual conclusions of law, even when a case does in fact
have merit, a priori are uncertain, then bringing a private antitrust case would only be
hindered further. The reason for this is that then the eventually awarded net damages
money and thereby the private incentives to sue for them would be reduced.36 This
would enhance the scope for erecting Illinois Walls. Analytically, it corresponds to a
reduction in ’, which decreases the value of ￿
￿.
The same is not true of we introduce public antitrust enforcement into the picture.
Where those advocating Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick would typically consider pri-
vate enforcement to be superior over public enforcement, the latter turns out to be a
desirable complement to the former when Illinois Walls are a possibility. Public cases,
no di⁄erent from private ones, will put stress on both the horizontal and the vertical
cartel arrangements, thus potentially undermining them. Although the incentive for
public o¢ cials to bring anticompetitive practices to light may indeed be less than
that of private parties themselves a⁄ected in their well-being by the cartel prices,
surely the antitrust authorities are a major player in this game. And should govern-
ment still miss them, parens patriae provisions for consumers and indirect purchasers
to ￿le complaints on the anticompetitive behavior of upstream ￿rms that are out of
their reach by Illinois Brick with their state antitrust enforcers or the Department
of Justice would clearly provide an incentive￿ albeit by far not to the extent pro-
vided by the treble damages reward￿ to notify cases to the authorities.37 Likewise,
other interested parties, such as shareholders, may defend their interest in a court
case. Yet, under reference to the previous observation that imperfect and asymmetric
information would fortify Illinois Walls, we believe that in a world with less than per-
fect information, public enforcement is no guarantee for full-proof protection against
collusion.
36 Cf. Lande (1993).
37 Cf. also J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 451 U.S. 557 (1981) discussed
in the introduction.
27Finally, we are con￿dent that extensions of our simple model to, for example,
non-linearity in demand or alternative cost structures, will not change our qualitative
￿ndings. Likewise, Illinois Walls surely are a possibility in longer vertical chains,
or chains that involve a larger number of upstream than downstream ￿rms, or vice
versa. Moreover, it is likely that there are further types of Illinois Walls based on
di⁄erent punishment strategies￿ such as forms of intertemporally alternating putting
on allocation, or a restoration in time of the collusive agreement if the wall happened
to come down.
6 Are We Facing Illinois Walls?
Pointing out a robust theoretical possibility as we do raises the question whether there
is any indication that Illinois Walls are indeed a reality. Levenstein and Suslow (2004)
argue that large customers need not always undermine cartels, as they may be implied
in the arrangement. The authors present several well-documented cartels in which
the distributors, rather than the manufacturers on whom investigations centered at
the time, were essential to the success of the cartel￿ typically by preventing entry into
the chain￿ and in return shared in the cartel rents.38 Yet, actual Illinois Walls would
require such implications to be designed with an eye to keeping the downstream ￿rms
from claiming private damages. The easy answer to the question of whether such
arrangements indeed exist is, of course, that by their nature, Illinois Walls escape
direct observation: they are tacit, hidden and silent. Moreover, so far their possible
existence was unknown. Only through speci￿cally targeted antitrust investigations
may Illinois Walls, therefore, perhaps be found out about in future enforcement. As
this may not be su¢ cient answer, however, we have gone back and considered some
unmasked, post-Illinois Brick cartels to see if they displayed symptoms of what could
have been vertical arrangements that tied downstream purchasers into an upstream
suppliers cartel. As it turns out, there is, in fact, some direct indication of essential
characteristics of our Illinois Wall example in some recent high pro￿le cases.
In the Brand Name Prescription Drugs antitrust litigation, a class action for an-
titrust damages brought in the early 1990￿ s by a number of retail pharmacists against
several pharmaceutical manufacturers￿ claiming that the manufacturers had price
discriminated between them and the larger health care organizations, thus putting
the plainti⁄s at a competitive disadvantage￿ there was a direct argument that the
wholesalers, who stood between the retailers and the manufacturers, were implied
in the alleged conspiracy.39 That is, the manufacturers and wholesalers had jointly
developed a computerized system to handle the complicated administrative process
38 In particular, the American ￿ bromine pool￿and Standard Oil had￿ albeit obviously well be-
fore the Illinois Brick rule￿ such characteristics. See Levenstein and Suslow (2004), p.26 and the
references therein given.
39 Cf. In re: Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 997, No. 94 C
897. We thank Bob Larner for pointing us to this Illinois Brick reference.
28of calculating the various discounts in the chain. This so-called ￿ chargeback￿system
was alleged to involve the wholesalers in the upstream cartel, giving them a stake
in the collusive pro￿ts. The court ruled that the wholesalers were indeed eliminated
as an independent control in the chain, so that the plainti⁄s were e⁄ectively direct
purchasers and thus entitled to damages under Illinois Brick. The case was settled in
1996, when the majority of drug manufacturers agreed to pay the retail pharmacists
damages totally $351 million.40
Although many public antitrust prosecutions originate in private noti￿cations, in
a number of recent cases brought by the DOJ that were widely publicized, the direct
purchasers were, in fact, conspicuous by their absence. In October 1996, Archer
Daniels Midland Co. agreed to plead guilty and pay a record criminal antitrust ￿ne
of $100 million for its role in a worldwide price ￿xing conspiracy in the markets for
lysine and citric acid.41 ADM followed the earlier confessions of involved Japanese
and Korean companies, who together paid $20 million in ￿nes. Lysine gained some
fame through the footage of cartel meetings shot by FBI in￿ltration. On the lysine-
tapes, the conspiring chief executives￿ several of which were later handed prison
sentences￿ are overheard and seen to agree, fully aware of the illegal nature of their
meetings, on prices and volumes scribbled on a white board. Also, the dominant
American executive of ADM impresses upon his Asian coconspirators the importance
of being ￿ close friends￿ , and how ADM￿ s excess capacity would need to be used in
case of any misunderstanding. The success of Lysine was repeated by the DOJ a
few years later when it uncovered, again with the help of the FBI, yet another large
global conspiracy of bulk inputs, this time in vitamins, which involved BASF and
Ho⁄mann-La Roche.42 In 2000, criminal ￿nes were given to the companies, as well
as prison sentences to some of their chief executives.
The lysine-tapes, as well as further investigatory techniques applied in Vitamins,
educated competition law enforcers￿ as well as the business community. One impor-
tant lesson drawn from this and other experiences by William Kolasky, at the time
Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the DOJ￿ s Antitrust Division, is that:
￿[T]he ability of large sophisticated buyers to defeat cartel activity may
be overrated. [...] In the lysine cartel, the buyers included Tysons Foods
and Con Agra; in citric acid, the buyers included Coca-Cola and Proc-
ter&Gamble; and in graphite electrodes, the victims included every major
steel producer in the world.￿(Kolasky, 2002, p.18)
It is at least peculiar that the direct purchasers of these conspirators were not instru-
mental in bringing the cartel arrangements to light. One would expect, for example,
40 See Scherer (1997) for a critical review of the case.
41 Cf. United States of America v. Ajinomoto Co., Inc. et al., No. 96-CR 520-1996. We
thank Margaret Levenstein and Bill Kovacic for suggesting Lysine and also Vitamins as examples
of peculiar downstream passiveness, possibly indicating implication.
42 Cf. Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, No. 99-197 TFH, 2000 WL 1737867.
29some of the larger clients to have experienced trouble in attempting to order volumes
above the cartel quota. No complaints, for example for refusal to deal, where made,
however. Perhaps that was because that sort of a thing is not on the minds of man-
agers. Perhaps also the direct purchasers were not fully innocent ￿ victims￿at all, as
Kolasky implicitly assumes, but rather had some so far unacknowledged interest that
prevented them from denouncing the cartel.
Another important case in which the direct purchasers were far from instrumen-
tal in unmasking anticompetitive behavior of their dominant supplier is noted in
Lopatka and Page (2004). The paper is an argument against repealing Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick at the federal level, essentially on the observation that for
the majority of cases in which the indirect purchasers ￿led suit, these were follow-
on damages claims by direct purchasers. Lopatka and Page infer from this that
￿experience shows that direct purchasers are not reluctant to sue.￿ 43 Although this
does not seem to evidence that not still possibly many direct purchasers may have
been hesitant to claim, it is particularly interesting that the authors themselves note
one striking exception to their generalization in U.S. v. Microsoft Corp..44 In this
public case, even in the follow-on litigation, although indirect purchasers ￿led class
action suits against Microsoft wherever state law gave them standing to sue, none
of Microsoft￿ s direct purchasers￿ that is, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
that pre-installed Microsoft software prior to shipping their computers￿ has to date
brought a claim against the company for damages. If indeed Microsoft￿ s exclusionary
and levying practices allowed it to charge sustained anticompetitively high prices for
its software, the OEM￿ s would have been hurt by this, and presumably have known
so. Again, however, the DOJ instigated the case on complaints of rivals, not the
direct purchasers, which led Lopatka and Page to suggest that:
￿[S]ome OEMs may have received compensation in return for cooperating
in restrictive practices, compensation that would in principle reduce the
amount of damages.￿(op. cit., p.563)
This is exactly the e⁄ective principle in our Illinois Wall example.
The Illinois Wall principle of ￿ putting on allocation￿has furthermore been re-
vealed to exist in a recent private damages case that did come to federal court,
Holiday Wholesale.45 In this class action of wholesalers and retailers against four
U.S. tobacco companies that together held 95% of the market for cigarettes, one of
the plainti⁄s￿arguments was that the tobacco companies abused their joint domi-
nance through a permanent allocation program. The manufacturers determined the
43 Lopatka and Page (2004), p.561.
44 Cf. United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, No. 98-1232.
45 Cf. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. et al., v. Philip Morris Incorporated, et al., No. 1:00-
CV-0447-JOF. We are indebted to Frank Fisher for pointing us to this example of intermediaries
that complained￿ as it seemed against their own interest￿ against being ￿ put on allocation￿by their
suppliers.
30number of cigarettes each wholesaler could yearly distribute, using a system in which
each of them was allowed only a small increase over the purchases of the previous
year, unless wholesalers could show that they had acquired new retail customers.
The tobacco companies argued that this system was in the interest of e¢ ciency, for
it allowed them to determine true consumer demand by keeping the wholesalers from
engaging in speculative stock accumulation￿ also referred to as ￿ trade loading￿ . Also,
it would reduce the amount of product returns in an e¢ cient manner. In the end, the
court found no evidence that the allocation programs indeed restricted the output
of cigarettes. Also, it took the view that the alleged collusive arrangement was, in
fact, the result of uncoordinated choices in an oligopolistic market. As a result, the
defendants￿motion for summary judgement was eventually granted in 2002. Yet,
perhaps the vertical rationing system was a poorly understood compensation scheme
that, if it had not come down and into the open, we would never have known about.
A similar symmetric rationing scheme to the bene￿t of intermediaries may well
have been the secret of the steady success of the De Beers diamond cartel. In July
2004, De Beers pleaded guilty to price ￿xing charges after being indicted by the
DOJ for the U.S. district court in Columbus, Ohio in 1994. Paying $10 million in
criminal ￿nes, it settled an impasse that had prevented its employees from travelling
in America out of fear for being arrested since World War II.46 The cartel￿ s business
model has always been to o⁄er in its London based Central Selling Organization, on
a limited number of occasions per year only, sorted bundles of rough diamonds to a
small group of selected clients at non-negotiable prices. These favoured ￿sightholders￿
would then cut and polish the rough stones, before selling them on in the chain to
retailers and eventually to ￿nal consumers. Although emphasis has primarily been on
the bene￿ts that accrued to De Beers itself from creating this arti￿cial scarcity and
consequential high prices, the select group of sightholders is likely to have bene￿tted
as well. Although the quality of the lots on take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er would vary, each
of the sightholders knew the o⁄er to their competitors would be equally restricted in
size and quality, in ways that evened out fairly symmetrically over time. It is again
remarkable, to say the least, that no private action to recover antitrust damages
against this textbook example of a cartel was brought in the past.
All these examples remain anecdotal evidence, however. Therefore, a more con-
sistent empirical study into the matter seems called for. Yet, as discussed in the
introduction, such studies in Landes and Posner (1979), Joyce and McGuckin (1986)
and Snyder (1986), in which the total number of private damages cases brought over
time displays structural breaks around the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick rulings,
has remained largely inconclusive. An interesting possibility for a novel statistical
approach to our hypothesis is o⁄ered, however, by the 1989 ARC America, also men-
tioned in the introduction. Since the number of Illinois Brick repealers has since the
early 1990￿ s grown steadily to presently include roughly half of the states, the presence
46 Cf. United States of America v. General Electric Company, De Beers Centenary AG, et al.,
No. CR-2-94-019-1994. See also The Economist, ￿The Cartel Isn￿ t For Ever,￿15 July, 2004.
31of Illinois Walls could be investigated by comparing the number of direct purchaser
suits in states that followed Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick with those in Illinois
Brick repealers. Our hypothesis would be that, corrected for cartel incidence￿ for
example by some measure of industrial activity￿ Illinois Brick repealers would see a
signi￿cantly higher number of antitrust damages claims ￿led by direct purchasers￿ or
in total, if the position in the chain is not easily determined from the ￿les. Although
this seems to be a promising approach, it is potentially quite troublesome. The pos-
sibilities for indirect purchasers vary between the repealers and are in fact, ine⁄ective
in some. Also some states readily certify classes, while others rarely do so, which
decreases the number of private damages cases in the latter, but not due to Illinois
Brick. More importantly, the data available on private damages claims is very incom-
plete, due to the large percentage of them that is settled out of court or dismissed.
As a result, consistent statistics are not readily available and allegedly di¢ cult to
compile.47 We therefore leave such direct empirical tests for future research.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have identi￿ed a so far largely ignored anticompetitive e⁄ect of the in￿ uential
twin Supreme Court rulings in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. Clearly, possibilities
for passing-on upstream cartel pro￿ts in the production chain are plentiful. Several
aspects important for understanding the full e⁄ect of private damages claims we have
set aside in order to o⁄er an unobstructed view on the strategic role that Illinois
Brick can play in stabilizing chain collusion in our example. As a result, the setup
of our model is simple. Yet, we believe it captures the nature of the anticompetitive
e⁄ect Illinois Brick may have. We have shown that the Illinois Wall is generic, has
serious welfare consequences and is resilient to extensions in a number of directions.
Moreover, we believe our model approach o⁄ers several handles to study the pass-
on of cartel bene￿ts in vertical production chains more generally￿ as said, a practice
observed by others before us to occur in collusive agreements. These pass-ons can
have interesting implications for vertical (dis)integration and double-marginalization
problems. Producers may want to use them in trying to coordinate, at least partially,
around these issues in modestly concentrated markets. Closer to our original idea,
vertically allocated cartel pro￿ts can help sustaining socially unwanted restrictions of
trade in less hostile circumstances than the U.S. clear and present danger of massive
treble damages suits. They are relevant for the Europe Union and its Member States,
for example, where a private antitrust damages practice is still in it infancy￿ in part
because multiple damages are not available￿ and restrictions on standing to sue for
antitrust damage reparation are being discussed.48
47 We are indebted to William Page and Robert Lande, who both pointed out some of these
di¢ culties that would potentially interfere with ￿nding unbiased results in the suggested approach.
48 Cf. Wils (2003).
32On the issue of Illinois Brick, we do acknowledge that we have not dealt more
than in passing with the larger part of the rule￿ s potential for e¢ ciency gain, in
particular the savings on legal transaction costs it is likely to bring about. We have
abstracted from these potential gains that have been the focus of attention in most
of the relevant literature, only in order to contribute a new argument to the debate.
Our e¢ ciency argument against Illinois Brick adds to the existing opposition to the
doctrine, based on fairness objections and a low assessment of the legal transaction
costs involved in antitrust damages cases. Obviously, for a full understanding of the
complex incentive issues that play in private antitrust enforcement, a balancing of
all the arguments is essential. Such comprehensive judgements we leave for others to
make.
It nevertheless seems that the possible abuse of the twin Supreme Court positions
in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick to construct Illinois Walls in vertical production
chains merits noti￿cation, and cannot be as easily discarded as the early literature
did. Its negative welfare e⁄ects need to be taken into consideration and weighted
against the potential e¢ ciency gains of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe that have so
far been forwarded. Because of its relevance to many prominent antitrust cases since
the late 1970￿ s, and some indication that Illinois Walls may indeed exist, the perverse
possibility that Illinois Brick o⁄ers upstream ￿rms to ward o⁄private antitrust cases
deserves acknowledgement.
33A Bricks for the Wall: Proofs and Intermediate
Results
A.1 Foundations of Consumer Demand
Lemma 1 Suppose the representative consumer￿ s utility function is given by



















where Qi, i = 1;:::;n, are di⁄erentiated varieties of the commodity under consideration,
e 2[0;1) is a measure of substitutability between these di⁄erent varieties, a and b are pref-
erence parameters and Q0 is a composite commodity with price equal to one and which
represents expenditures on all other available commodities. Assuming that a = b = 1 the
demand for variety i, i = 1;:::;n, is given by
Qi (P1;:::;Pn) =
1 ￿ e ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 2)e)Pi + e
P
j6=i Pj
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)
=
(1 ￿ e)(1 ￿ Pi) ￿ e
P
j6=i (Pi ￿ Pj)
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)
: (1)
Proof. Let the consumer have budget M to spend. He or she seeks to maximize utility
given the budget constraint. The Langrangian for this problem is



















+￿(M ￿ Q0 ￿ P1Q1 ￿ ::: ￿ PnQn):
Provided that M is large enough, the ￿rst-order condition associated with Qi is
1 ￿ Qi ￿ e
X
j6=i
Qj ￿ Pi = 0;
for i = 1;:::;n and
1 ￿ ￿ = 0;
for i = 0, so that ￿ = 1: Using this, and solving the system of the n ￿rst-order conditions












































































which is demand system (1). Furthermore, demand for the composite good follows from
the budget constraint as




Note that demand for each of the di⁄erent varieties is independent of M, if M is large
enough. Variations in M will only in￿ uence the demand for the composite good.
Lemma 2 When all varieties are equally priced, i.e., Pi = P for i = 1;:::;n; the indirect
utility function can be written as
V (P;:::;P;M) = M +
n
2(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)
(1 ￿ P)
2 :
Total surplus (consumer welfare plus industry pro￿ts) are
T (P;M) = M +
n
2(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)
￿
1 ￿ P2￿
Proof. When all prices are equal we obtain from (1) that demand for each commodity is
Q(P) ￿ Qi (P;:::;P) =
(1 ￿ P)
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)
for i = 1;:::;n.
Consequently, indirect utility at uniform prices is found as











n((n ￿ 1)e + 1)Q2
= M +
n
2(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)
(1 ￿ P)
2 : (13)
35Total surplus is given by
T (P;M) = V (P;:::;P;M) + nPQ(P)
= M +
n
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A.2 The Competitive Benchmark
Lemma 3 Given the input prices (p1;:::;pn), the following Bertrand-Nash equilibrium

















4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2
B0
e;n = (2 + (2n ￿ 3)e)(1 ￿ e)
C0
e;n = (2 + (n ￿ 2)e)(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)
D0
e;n = e(1 + (n ￿ 2)e):
Proof. Firm i sets Pi in order to maximize pro￿ts (Pi ￿ pi)Qi (P1;:::;Pn). Using (1), the
￿rst-order condition for ￿rm i is
2(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)Pi ￿ e
X
j6=i
Pj = ￿i ￿ 1 ￿ e + (1 + (n ￿ 2)e)pi:
















































































4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2;
and the other parameters follow straightforwardly.
Lemma 4 The implied demand for upstream ￿rm i is given by







1 + (n ￿ 1)e
2 + (4n ￿ 7)e + (2n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 2)e2
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2 > 0;
Be;n =
1 + (n ￿ 2)e
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)
2 + 3(n ￿ 2)e +
￿
5 ￿ 5n + n2￿
e2
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2 > 0 and
Ce;n =
1
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)
e(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)
2
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2 > 0:
Proof. Input prices (p1;:::;pn) give rise to the downstream Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
prices (P1 (p1;:::;pn);:::;Pn (p1;:::;pn)), which implies that the input demand of down-
stream ￿rm i for the product of upstream ￿rm i is given by
qi (p1;:::;pn) = Qi (P1 (p1;:::;pn);:::;Pn (p1;:::;pn)):
For ease of exposition we write (1) and (2) as
Qi (P1;:::;Pn) = f
0












(2 + (2n ￿ 3)e)(1 ￿ e)
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2;
￿ =
(2 + (n ￿ 2)e)(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2;
￿ =
e(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2;
a = 1 ￿ e;
b = 1 + (n ￿ 2)e;
f =
1
(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)
:
37Using (15) we ￿nd
qi (p1;:::;pn) = f
0






Substituting the values for ￿, ￿, ￿, a, b and f we ￿nd the input demand function given in
(3).
Lemma 5 The competitive benchmark Bertrand-Nash equilibrium values are:
Pc = (1 ￿ e)
6 + 9(n ￿ 2)e +
￿
3n2 ￿ 14n + 14
￿
e2




2 + (4n ￿ 7)e + (2n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 2)e2￿
(1 ￿ e)
4 + (9n ￿ 19)e + 2(3n ￿ 5)(n ￿ 3)e2 + (n ￿ 2)(n2 ￿ 7n + 8)e3;
qc = Qc =
1 + (n ￿ 2)e
1 + (n ￿ 1)e
2 + 3(n ￿ 2)e +
￿
5 ￿ 5n + n2￿
e2
(4 + (5n ￿ 11)e + (8 ￿ 7n + n2)e2)((n ￿ 3)e + 2)
;
￿c = (1 ￿ e)
1 + (n ￿ 2)e
1 + (n ￿ 1)e
  ￿
2 + 3(n ￿ 2)e +
￿
5 ￿ 5n + n2￿
e2￿
((n2 ￿ 7n + 8)e2 + (5n ￿ 11)e + 4)((n ￿ 3)e + 2)
!2
;
￿c = (1 ￿ e)
1 + (n ￿ 2)e
1 + (n ￿ 1)e
(2n ￿ 3)e + 2
(n ￿ 3)e + 2
2 + 3(n ￿ 2)e +
￿
5 ￿ 5n + n2￿
e2
(4 + (5n ￿ 11)e + (8 ￿ 7n + n2)e2)
2:
Proof. Upstream ￿rm i chooses pi such that, given the prices set by the other upstream
￿rms, pro￿ts pi
￿




are maximized. This returns ￿rst-order con-
ditions




From these, it follows that the symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price is
pc =
Ae;n
2Be;n ￿ (n ￿ 1)Ce;n
:
Using the de￿nitions of Ae;n, Be;n and Ce;n given in Lemma 4, the equilibrium value of p,
pc in the lemma, follows. Inserting it in equations (2) and (3), the equilibrium values for Pc
and qc = Qc follow. Finally, downstream ￿rm pro￿ts can be found by substituting outputs
and prices in ￿ = (P ￿ p)q, and likewise upstream ￿rm pro￿ts are ￿ = pq.
38A.3 Upstream Collusion
Lemma 6 If the upstream industry colludes and maximizes joint pro￿ts, it will then set
pa = 1





1 + (n ￿ 1)e
2 + (4n ￿ 7)e + (2n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 2)e2
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2;





1 + (n ￿ 1)e
2 + (4n ￿ 7)e + (2n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 2)e2
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2:
In best-reply to the upstream cartel, the downstream ￿rms will in Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
each set
Pa =
6 + (8n ￿ 17)e + (2n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 4)e2
8 + 12(n ￿ 2)e + 2(2n2 ￿ 9n + 9)e2;





1 + (n ￿ 1)e
2 + (2n ￿ 5)e ￿ (2n ￿ 3)e2
8 + 12(n ￿ 2)e + 2(2n2 ￿ 9n + 9)e2
2 + (4n ￿ 7)e + (2n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 2)e2
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2:














The ￿rst-order condition with respect to price pk is














using the expressions for Ae;n, Be;n and Ce;n determined before in Lemma 4. The output
for each individual upstream ￿rm i will then be
qi (pa
1;:::;pa




Finally, individual upstream ￿rm pro￿t is going to be




39which is equal to the expression given in the lemma. Substituting pa in (2), the values for
Pa and ￿a follow straightforwardly.
Proof of Proposition 1.
As explained in the text, the essential di¢ culty in showing deterrence is the possibility
that damages claims may be let to accumulate rather than being ￿led. The proof that this
is not pro￿table when back-damages are bounded proceeds in four steps. Step 1 and 2
derive two intermediate results. In Step 3 it is established that any accumulation time is
￿nite. Deterrence of the cartel is then argued in Step 4.
Step 1. Total welfare decreases in the upstream cartel price. To see this, let the uniform
cartel price be p1 = ::: = pn = p, leading to a uniform consumer price which we denote
P (p) ￿ P (p;:::;p). By Lemma 3, @P














Step 2. If consumers and downstream ￿rms always claim and ￿ ￿ ￿￿; any upstream cartel
is deterred. To see this, note that the cartel will be deterred if
pcQc ￿ e ￿ (p) = p e Q(P (p)) ￿ ￿(P (p) ￿ Pc + p ￿ pc) e Q(P (p)): (16)
where e Q(P (p)) ￿ Q(P (p);:::;P (p)). Since both P (p) and Q(P (p)) are linear in p,
it follows that net cartel pro￿ts e ￿ (p) are quadratic in p: Obviously we restrict attention
to p ￿ pc. In fact, if we denote P (p) = a1 + a2p and e Q(P (p)) = b1 ￿ b2p, the exact
expressions for the positive parameters a1, a2, b1 and b2 can be found from Lemmas 3 and
4, the coe¢ cient for the quadratic term is easily seen to be b2 (￿1 + ￿ + ￿a2). This implies
that e ￿ (p) is a convex function in p if and only if ￿1 + ￿ + ￿a2 ￿ 0 or








Notice that for p large enough, e ￿ (p) goes to zero, since demand e Q(P (p)) goes to zero for
high enough prices. Convexity of e ￿ (p) therefore implies that e ￿ (p) is maximized at p = pc.
Hence, the cartel will be deterred for ￿ ￿ ￿￿.
The magnitude of the critical damage multiple is determined by @P





(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)(2 + (2n ￿ 3)e)
4 + 6(n ￿ 2)e + (2n2 ￿ 9(n ￿ 1))e2:
It can easily be veri￿ed that 1
2 ￿ @P
@p ￿ 1, which implies 1
2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2
3. Note that the value
of ￿￿ depends on n and e. In particular, when the market is more competitive￿ that is, for
high values for n and e￿ the value of ￿￿ decreases. The intuition for this is that downstream
￿rms will then pass on more of the damages to the consumers (i.e., @P
@p increases), thereby
40increasing total damages and decreasing the damage multiple su¢ cient for cartel deterrence.
Also note that ￿ ￿ ￿￿ is a su¢ cient, but not a necessary condition for cartel deterrence.
Step 3. Damages will be claimed in ￿nite time. The reason for this is as follows. When
a cartel is formed, consumers and the downstream industry each have to decide when to
claim for reparation of their damages. Note that in this perfect legal world, the ￿rst to
claim will break the cartel and instantaneously unravel all further claims. When faced with
anticompetitively raised prices, parties can claim right away, in the ￿rst period of the law
breaching, or they can ￿ wait and see￿ , in the meantime accumulating a damages claim that
surpasses their true hurt. Assuming the cartel starts in period t = 0; we will demonstrate
that there is a ￿nite time period T￿ in which the consumers will claim their accumulated
damages. This implies that also all downstream ￿rms will claim no later than T￿, and
possibly earlier.
Since indirect utility can be written as V (P1;:::;Pn;M) = b V (P1;:::;Pn) + M (see
Lemma 2) we can simply aggregate money (or damages) and indirect utility to study wel-
fare e⁄ects. Denote by ￿ ￿ ￿(P (p) ￿ Pc)nQ(P (p)) the damages, over one period, that
consumers can claim and by Vd ￿ V (Pc;:::;Pc;M) ￿ V (P (p);:::;P (p);M) the loss in
indirect utility arising from the upstream cartel. If damages ￿ are su¢ ciently high, con-
sumers may have an incentive to delay claiming. Consider an arbitrary time period T ￿ 0.
Claiming at the end of period T will grant consumers an accumulated damages claim of
￿T, whereas delaying claiming for more period would give them ￿T+1 ￿ Vd, which should
be discounted one period back. Claiming in period T is therefore preferred to claiming in
period T + 1 when
￿T > ￿ [￿T+1 ￿ Vd]: (17)
If a statute of limitations applies and Ts is ￿nite, then it is easily seen that this condition
holds for all T ￿ Ts, since for those T we have ￿T+1 = ￿T so that there is no incentive to
wait. We can therefore restrict attention to cases in which the statute does not apply. In


























1 ￿ ￿T+2 ￿ ￿: (18)
Given ￿xed parameter values ￿ < 1 and ￿ < 1; there always exists a ￿nite T￿ such that this
last inequality holds. Moreover, it is easily checked that for all T > 0 and all ￿ < 1 we have
1 ￿ ￿T+2
1 ￿ ￿T+3 >
1 ￿ ￿T+1
1 ￿ ￿T+2;
41which implies that if condition (18) holds for T = T￿; then it will hold for any T > T￿.
Hence, consumers￿ and thus all parties with standing to sue￿ claim no later than in period
T￿.
Step 4. Upstream collusion will now be deterred by the following logic. We are left with
two possibilities. If an upstream cartel forms, either it is instantaneously sued, or claims are
postponed for a ￿nite number of periods and then brought for (depreciated) accumulated
damages. By Step 2, we know that instantaneous action deters the upstream cartel from
forming, as long as ￿ > ￿￿. Now consider the possibility of extended claims. According to
this scenario, the downstream industry and the consumers ￿ bene￿t￿from the existence of an
upstream cartel in conjunction with the possibilities to claim. However, as shown in Step
1, because total surplus is lower in each period, and since discount factors are assumed to
be common between consumers, down- and upstream ￿rms, it follows that the consumers
and the downstream industry can only accumulate a claim at the expense of the upstream
industry. As a result, the upstream industry, knowing that it will one day face the claim,
will refrain from colluding if all parties have standing to sue.
A.4 Illinois Walls
Lemma 7 If the rationing scheme (p;q) satis￿es
q ￿
(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)
(2 + (n ￿ 3)e)(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)
(1 ￿ p); (19)
then the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the downstream industry invoked by that rationing
scheme is characterized by prices
P (q) = 1 ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 1)e)q;
so that output and pro￿t follow as
Q(q) = q and ￿(p;q) =
￿
P (q) ￿ p
￿
q = (1 ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 1)e)q ￿ p)q:
Proof. The Lagrangian of the constrained downstream pro￿t maximization problem is
L(Pi;￿) = (Pi ￿ p)Qi (P1;:::;Pn) + ￿[q ￿ Qi (P1;:::;Pn)];
leading to ￿rst-order conditions







￿[q ￿ Qi (P1;:::;Pn)] = 0;￿ ￿ 0 and q ￿ Qi (P1;:::;Pn) ￿ 0
42There are two candidates for the optimum: one in which the constraint binds (￿ > 0) and
one in which it does not (￿ = 0). First, consider the solution for which ￿ > 0. In this case,
it follows from Qi (P1;:::;Pn) = q that
Pi =
1 ￿ e + e
P
j6=i Pj ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 1)e)(1 ￿ e)q
1 + (n ￿ 2)e
:
Prices in the symmetric quantity restricted Bertrand-Nash equilibrium then are
P (q) = 1 ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 1)e)q;
from which the stated quantity and pro￿t follow straightforwardly, using consumer demand
(1).
Next, consider the solution for which ￿ = 0. In this case, the ￿rst-order condition
Qi + (Pi ￿ p)
@Qi
@Pi = 0 returns
0





A ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 2)e)(Pi ￿ p) = 0:
Solving for the symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, we now obtain
P￿ =
1 ￿ e + (1 + (n ￿ 2)e)p
2 + (n ￿ 3)e
:
This equilibrium, in which downstream ￿rms choose to purchase less than q, requires that
P￿ > P. It does not exist as long as P￿ ￿ P. Condition (19) assures it does not, so that
only the solution corresponding to the binding rationing scheme remains, as long as (19) is
satis￿ed.
Proof of Theorem 1. As observed in the text, the upstream cartel will always choose
(pw;qw) such that (8) holds with equality, and pw ￿ pc. The proof proceeds in four steps.
First the incentive constraint will be used to write p as a function of q. Then, this relation
is used to maximize upstream pro￿ts. Then the values of ￿ for which the optimal value of q
is (weakly) lower than the Bertrand-Nash quantity qc is established. Finally, we show that
for the rationing scheme (pw;qw) condition (19) of Lemma 7 holds, so that each retailer will
accept the full o⁄er.
Step 1. The binding incentive constraint simpli￿es to
￿
1 ￿ ￿




Note that obviously (pc;qc) satis￿es this constraint, for under regular Bertrand competition,
there would be no damages. Hence, the pro￿t maximizing cartel supply of inputs at low
prices needs to give weakly higher pro￿ts to the cartel than under competition, for otherwise
43the cartel would choose to compete honestly. Using the de￿nition of the overcharge and the


























Step 2. The upstream pro￿ts, using this relationship between p and q along the incentive
constraint, now can be written as










which is maximized at a quantity that satis￿es
@P (q)
@q
q + P (q) +
1 ￿ ￿
￿
’pc = 0: (20)
Let this quantity be qw￿ where ￿ w￿refers to this being the situation under the wall￿ which
depends on 1￿￿




























Note that this condition is equivalent with
P (qw) ￿ Pc:
Combining it with ￿rst-order condition (20) evaluated at q = qc; we obtain
@P (qc)
@q




which, using the fact that for our speci￿c model we have
@P(qc)







44It follows that for ￿ >
’pc
’pc+(1￿2Pc), pw > pc and ￿w > ￿c. Using the speci￿cations for Pc and











’pc + (1 ￿ 2Pc)





#(n;e) = (1 ￿ e)((2n ￿ 3)e + 2)((n ￿ 3)e + 2) and
￿ (n;e) =
￿





e2 ￿ 2(2n ￿ 7)e ￿ 4:




1 ￿ e + (1 + (n ￿ 2)e)pw
2 + (n ￿ 3)e
; (21)
for all values of ￿ and ’ such that 1￿￿
￿ ’ ￿ 1￿2Pc
pc . Note that by construction for 1￿￿
￿ ’ =
1￿2Pc
pc we have P
w = Pc, qw = qc and pw = pc, so that in that case (19) holds with equality.
Using the explicit expressions for P
w and pw; condition (21) reduces to





























De￿ning a ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ’ this last inequality can be rewritten as f (a) ￿ 0, where





(1 + a) ￿ 2(1 ￿ e)(1 + a)(1 + apc)
￿(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)
￿
(1 + apc)
2 ￿ 4(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)￿c
￿
:
Notice that f (a) is a third-degree polynomial in a, one root of which is given by a￿ = 1￿2Pc
pc .






c0 + c1a + c2a2￿
;
for certain constants c0, c1 and c2. Non-negativity of these coe¢ cients c0, c1 and c2 is a
su¢ cient condition for f (a) to be nonnegative for all a ￿ 1￿2Pc
pc , which is what we want to
45show. The coe¢ cients c0, c1 and c2 have to satisfy the following four restrictions:
1 ￿ 2Pc
pc c0 = (1 + (n ￿ 2)e)(4(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)￿c) ￿ (1 ￿ e);
1 ￿ 2Pc
pc c1 ￿ c0 = (n ￿ 1)e ￿ 2(2 + (n ￿ 3)e)pc;
1 ￿ 2Pc
pc c2 ￿ c1 = ￿(3 + (2n ￿ 5)e)(pc)
2 ￿ 2(1 ￿ e)pc; and
￿c2 = ￿(2 + (n ￿ 3)e)(pc)
2 :
From the last two restrictions, we obtain that c1 and c2 are positive. What remains to be
shown is that c0 ￿ 0, or equivalently that
(1 + (n ￿ 2)e)(4(1 + (n ￿ 1)e)￿c) ￿ (1 ￿ e):
Straightforward computations, using the expressions for Pc, pc and ￿c from Lemma 5, re-
turn that this is equivalent to Pc ￿ 1
2, which demarcates precisely the case we are restricting
attention to. Hence, there will be no unilateral incentive to purchase and produce less than
maximum rationed capacity.
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